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ABSTRACT
Negotiated Settlement and the Durability of Peace: Agreement Design,
Implementation, and Mediated Civil Wars

by

Chong Chen, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2015
Major Professor: Colin Flint
Department: Political Science
Existing research has shown that negotiated peace agreements are less likely to
sustain an enduring peace in the aftermath of civil wars. A large proportion of research
concentrates on the effects of either agreement design or agreement implementation
on the likelihood of civil war resumption. Generally, existing studies fail to integrate
design and implementation as separate parts of an interdependent process. Studies
also tend to ignore the implication of preceding agreement design on subsequent
implementation. This research develops an integrative framework that engages both
the agreement design and implementation stages in the civil war peace process. It also
examines the effects of third-party mediation on the durability of peace agreement
in the aftermath of civil wars through its influence on the quality of agreement
design and implementation. The presence of third-party mediation helps to resolve
future uncertainty and fear resulting from the “commitment problem” between war
combatants, and thus makes peace agreements more durable. By using compiled
data from the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset, the Civil War Mediation (CWM)
dataset, and the Power-Sharing Event Dataset (PSED), this research employs a Cox
Proportional Hazards model to test the implication of design and implementation on
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the durability of postwar peace. The results suggest that the effect of mediation on
peace durability is conditional upon the stages of the peace process. Peace agreements
designed and implemented by mediators are more likely to sustain lasting peace. The
results also indicate that not all implementation of power-sharing pacts, as promised
in the design stage, can produce pacifying effects given the fact that implementing
certain types of power-sharing pacts disrupts peace processes.
(56 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
Negotiated Settlement and the Durability of Peace: Agreement Design,
Implementation and Mediated Civil Wars
by
Chong Chen

Since the end of the Cold War, outright military victories in civil wars have
been rare. As a result, the number of peace agreements designed to end civil wars in
the post-Cold War era has increased exponentially compared to the entire Cold War
period. However, according to some statistics, about a third of those peace agreements
failed to secure postwar peace. These failures to get warring parties to live up to
their peace agreements not only restarted armed conflict, but they also escalated the
violence. Therefore, this project is aimed to explore why some civil war settlements
break down within months whereas others produce a lasting peace in the aftermath
of civil wars in the post-Cold War era. By using a newly compiled dataset, this
thesis examines the conditions under which international mediation can help warring
parties design and implement negotiated settlements and their subsequent impact
on the durability of post-civil war peace. The statistical results suggest that not all
international mediation can produce a pacifying effect on the postwar peace. Only
those peace agreements designed and implemented with the help of an international
mediator are more likely to sustain longer peace.
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INTRODUCTION

Recently, the widespread occurrence of civil wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya and
Syria, and the difficulties surrounding their resolution have made the adoption of more
effective policies an important concern for the international community (Mattes and
Savun 2009, 737). Consequently, an increasing body of scholarly works has examined
the onset, duration and outcome of civil wars (see Aydin and Regan 2012; Collier
and Hoeffler 2004; Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2004; Cunningham, Gleditsch and
Salehyan 2009; Fearon 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hultquist 2013; Karl and Sobek
2004; Kathman 2011; Sambanis 2002, 2004). Unlike interstate wars, however, civil
wars are more likely to experience a recurrence of conflict (Mason et al. 2011; Quinn,
Mason and Gurses 2007).
Although the number of peace agreements designed to end civil wars in the
post-Cold War era has increased exponentially compared to the entire Cold War
period (Badran 2014),
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almost a third of them have failed to secure peace in the

aftermath of the war (Walter 2009, 256). In Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, and
twice in Angola, the failure to get warring parties to live up to their peace agreements
not only restarted armed conflict, it also escalated the violence. For example, the
breakdown of the 1994 Arusha Accords in Rwanda led to a genocide of some 800,000
people, approximately fifty times more deaths than had occurred in the 1990-1993
civil war (Stedman 2001). By contrast, the peace agreements in 1992 ending the
civil war in El Salvador, and, more recently, the agreement in 2005 ending the civil
war between Indonesia government and the Aceh-Sumatra National Liberation Front
1

Throughout this research, I use the “agreement” and “settlement” interchangeably when
discussing existing research, though there are differences between them. Generally, settlement and
agreement essentially refer to a similar war outcome which involves negotiation and cooperative
relationship. Settlement is broader term than agreement in the civil war literature. However, since
I use the UCDP agreement dataset in this project, there is only minimal difference between them
for empirical analysis.
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(ASNLF, also called the Free Aceh movement) still endure. Why do some civil war
settlements break down within months whereas others produce a lasting
peace?
Unfortunately, as Badran (2014) argued, we still know little about whether,
how, when and why peace agreements can produce their expected effects. Moreover,
existing research has rarely addressed the connections between the design and the
implementation of civil war settlements and the durability of postwar peace (Badran
2014; Findley 2013; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). Breakdown of negotiated settlements
may result from flawed design, or incomplete implementation, or a combination of the
two, or other factors. I explore whether, and how, negotiated settlements are designed
and implemented influences how long peace may endure in the aftermath of civil wars.
In this research, I develop an integrative analytical framework that tries to
combine agreement design with its implementation. In addition, I investigate the role
of third-party mediation in these two stages to understand variations in postwar
peace durability.

While the past decade has witnessed the growing presence of

mediation in interstate conflict, the emphasis on mediation in ending civil wars
has been relatively rare (Gurses, Rost and McLeod 2008, 134).

Hence, studies

have ignored how mediation can help to secure postwar peace by mitigating the
“commitment problem” (Fearon 1995, 2004). The “commitment problem” is essential
to understanding civil war recurrence because during the disarming and demobilizing
phase each side knows that it would be better off with a “sucker” outcome: induce
your rival to disarm while you covertly retain enough military capability to annihilate
them once they are disarmed. Since both sides have this incentive and both sides
know “their rival has the same incentive, neither can trust their rival’s commitment
to disarm and demobilize under the terms of the settlement” (Walter 2002, 34-37).
Most existing studies argue that the careful design of the peace agreement by war
combatants themselves (for example, the inclusion of certain power-sharing provisions)
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can resolve the “commitment problem” (Fearon 1995). However, I contend that a
credible “commitment problem” is inherent in both the design and implementation of
agreement stages and cannot be resolved completely by the combatants themselves in
either stage. Instead, it can “arise or continue into the implementation phase based on
rebels’ fear of government reneging and/or government apprehension to cede power”
(DeRouen and Chowdhury 2013, 2). The presence of a third-party mediator can help
to overcome this problem by providing “private information” about actor’s strength,
resolve, and preferences to the opponent, and thereby reducing fear and uncertainty in
the subsequent implementation stage (DeRouen and Chowdhury 2013; Fearon 1995).
Consequently, the active involvement of a third-party mediator in both design and
implementation can be the most effective pathway to an enduring post-civil war peace.
I propose a 2×2 typology to explain the effects of self designed agreement
versus mediated designed agreement and self implemented agreement versus mediated
implemented agreement on peace durability in the aftermath of civil wars. Based upon
Bell’s (2008, 305) definition of a peace agreement and the criteria used in the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program (Högbladh 2011), I investigate the design-implementation
nexus to see how the “commitment problem” can be resolved and peace can be
sustained in the presence of third-party mediation. Generally, by providing a reliable
channel of information between disputants, mediation can mitigate these commitment
problems. Because the rebels are usually vulnerable in a negotiated settlement, they
must ponder the state’s willingness and ability to provide adequate security upon
demobilization. After all, the state was not able to fend off the rebellion in the first
place (DeRouen and Chowdhury 2013). However, once demobilization has begun, the
rebels lose their ability to fight against the state. If the signed agreement cannot be
put into practice, once war recurred, the rebels have lost some ability to fight. This
concern of the rebels influences their commitment to the peace process in the peace
agreement design stage of the process. The presence of mediation can allay suspicion
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and mistrust that comes in the implementation stage.
I compile data that encompass every peace agreement signed after the cessation
of a civil war in the years between 1989 and 2006 from the UCDP Peace Agreement
Dataset (Harbom, Högbladh and Wallensteen 2006), the Civil War Mediation (CWM)
dataset (DeRouen, Bercovitch and Pospieszna 2011) and the Power-Sharing Event
Dataset (PSED) (Ottmann and Vüllers 2014). I employ the Cox Proportional model
to test my theoretical framework. I find that the effect of mediation on postwar peace
durability is conditional upon the stages of the peace process. Mediated designed
peace agreements with mediated implementation are more likely to sustain lasting
peace. The results also indicate that not all implementation of power-sharing pacts,
as promised in the design stage, can produce pacifying effects given the fact that
implementing certain types of power-sharing pacts may disrupt peace settlements.
The rest of this thesis proceeds as follows. I first briefly review previous research
on the determinants of the durability of peace in the aftermath of civil wars. Then I lay
out my explanatory framework by integrating settlement design and implementation
as two interdependent stages of a peace process and state my major hypotheses. I
then introduce my research design and methodology employed to test my hypotheses.
Finally I report the statistical results and conclude the thesis.
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LITERATURE REVIEW

The growing body of scholarly work on civil war settlements has explored
“some obstacles that may frustrate postwar peace” (Badran 2014, 195), such as
security problems (Hartzell, Hoddie and Rothchild 2001), asymmetric information
(Mattes and Savun 2009), distributional problems (Fearon 1998), and governance
problems (Lake and Rothchild 2005). In general, each of these approaches addresses a
central issue in the recurrence of civil wars, the “commitment problem” (Fearon 1995;
Mattes and Savun 2009; Powell 2006). Generally, the literature assumes that “the
credible commitment problem leaves the signatories with fear of future uncertainties
concerning both their physical security and their abilities to pursue the interests of
the constituency they claim to represent”(Joshi and Mason 2011, 390). As a result,
most research is essentially about what kinds of power-sharing provisions should be
included in the settlements in the design stage and how to implement those provisions.
The dominant approach, the “constitutive school” (Arnault 2006), thus relates the
duration of peace in the aftermath of civil wars to the substance and design quality
of the peace agreement.
By contrast, the “instrumental school” stresses issues that prevent the translation
of the words of an agreement from being deeds in the implementation process, such
as implementation costs, state capacity, postwar political and economic development,
and so on (Arnault 2006; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008). However, existing research
often ignores the connections between these two approaches. Sometimes, even a good
quality peace agreement may not be implemented and thus leads to the breakdown
of the peace agreement. Yet we have seen that some flawed agreements have been
successfully implemented and, surprisingly, lasted for a long time. Therefore, the
design and implementation of a peace agreement should not be treated separately,
and the nexus between them is essential to understanding why some peace agreements
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have failed while others have succeeded.

The Promise of Agreement and Postwar Peace
From the “constitutive school” perspective, a “well-designed” settlement that
successfully resolves the commitment problem will produce durable peace whereas a
“badly designed” settlement will result in delays, setbacks, or even the collapse of
the peace process (Arnault 2006). Proponents of the “constitutive school” argue that
certain dimensions of power-sharing provisions designed in negotiated settlements
create stronger incentives for protagonists to sustain the peace rather than to resume
armed conflict. For example, Badran (2014) created an index to evaluate the overall
quality of peace agreement design to see how the design quality affects the durability
of peace. He found that agreements carefully designed to deal with all obstacles
to cooperation have the strongest pacifying effects. More specifically, Hoddie and
Hartzell (2003) found agreements which include provisions for sharing or dividing
military power among former combatants have significantly improved the prospects
for sustaining peace after civil wars end. This is because, they argued, implementing
this kind of peace agreement sent a concrete signal of a genuine commitment to peace
as signatories to an agreement prove willing to endure the costs associated with both
compromising their original war aims and withstanding potential challenges from
within their own groups. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) also argued that power sharing
provisions have cumulative impact on the duration of peace after civil war: the more
dimensions of power-sharing provisions (political, economic, military and territorial)
among former combatants specified in a peace agreement the higher the likelihood
that peace will endure.
However, DeRouen, Lea and Wallensteen (2009) challenged Hartzell and Hoddie
(2003) by pointing out that power-sharing provisions that are costlier to the government
and more difficult to implement will decrease the life span of the peace agreement.
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They examined three forms of power-sharing provisions which include military (e.g.,
integration of rebels into the army), territorial (e.g., autonomy), and political (e.g,
shared government). Their empirical findings indicate that the less costly government
concessions of military integration and autonomy increase the durability of peace
agreement, while political power-sharing provisions have a negative but insignificant
impact on peace duration. Mattes and Savun (2009) examined two types of settlement
provisions (i.e., fear-reducing and cost-increasing) that may mitigate commitment
problems and found that only political power-sharing arrangements have a significant
effect on the durability of peace.
These studies are more concerned with which kind of peace agreement design
is better than the other. They do not provide any information about the extent to
which these power-sharing provisions are actually implemented. Hence the frequency
of inconclusive findings. Consequently, it is not possible to assess whether it is the
design quality of a settlement that makes peace more likely to prevail, or whether
the implementation of such a settlement increases the peace duration. Therefore,
only by controlling for other factors rather than design dimensions can we determine
whether design quality leads to the failure or success of a peace agreement. As a
result, the “instrumental school” holds that we should look beyond the content of
these agreements by investigating whether and how peace agreements are actually
put into practice (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008).

The Practice of Agreement and Postwar Peace
In theory, negotiated settlements can be implemented either by combatants
themselves (i.e., self implementation) or mostly with the help of third parties (mediated
implementation). Due to the commitment problem in civil wars, many scholars argue
that peace agreements are more likely to fail without third party guarantees (Walter
2002). They hold that power-sharing arrangements in post-civil war society are only

8

temporary measures to induce rival groups to sign a peace agreement. Instead security
guarantees from a third-party can help sustain durable peace in the implementation
of these settlements. Civil war combatants’ payoffs are structured in a way that their
optimal strategy would be to defect (not to cooperate) no matter what their rival
does. For this reason, settlements become more likely to sustain peace when third
parties provide security guarantees during the disarming and demobilizing phases.
The presence of a third party guarantor, such as a UN peacekeeping force, may help
to promote peace in the aftermath of civil wars (Walter 2002, 2004).
For example, Quinn et al. (2007) found that negotiated settlements supported
by peacekeeping forces are less likely to breakdown into renewed civil war than
negotiated settlements not supported by peacekeeping forces. Similarly, Doyle and
Sambanis (2000) and Sambanis and Doyle (2007) found a positive relationship between
UN peacekeeping and peace duration in the aftermath of civil wars. Fortna (2004,
2008), Hartzell and Hoddie (2007), Findley (2013), Quinn et al. (2007), and Mattes
and Savun (2009) also found that third parties appear to have a positive effect
on implementation after controlling for variables that may affect the likelihood of
civil war recurrence. Furthermore, Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2008) focused on
post-conflict risk reduction and found that UN peacekeeping significantly reduces the
risk of renewed war. Durable peace after civil war appears to depend upon an external
military presence sustaining a gradual economic recovery, with political design playing
a somewhat subsidiary role. However, Beardsley (2013) found contrary evidence that
UN peacekeeping has, in the long run, less impact on the durability of peace after
civil war. Mukherjee (2006) also found that third party enforcement by the UN does
not have a significant effect on the hazard ratio of peace spells while democracy and
a proportional representation electoral system reduces the likelihood that civil war
may recur.
Other studies regarding the implementation process focused on how the postwar
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environment, such as economic development and political power arrangement, influence
the quality of the agreement implementation and thus the durability of peace (DeRouen,
Lea and Wallensteen 2009; Mason et al. 2011). For example, Quinn, Mason and
Gurses (2007) found that post-war economic development reduces the probability of
civil war recurrence. Walter (2004) argued that a situation of individual hardship or
severe dissatisfaction with one’s current situation and the absence of any nonviolent
means for change increases the probability of recurring civil war. Countries that
provide higher levels of economic well-being to their citizenry and create an open
political system are less likely to experience multiple civil wars regardless of what
happened in a previous conflict. This is consistent with Fearon and Laitin’s (2003)
conclusion that poverty favors rebel recruitment and political instability.
Likewise, political development in the postwar environment also has an influence
on the durability of postwar peace. Joshi and Mason (2011) found that the composition
of the governing coalition in post-civil war society structured by the power-sharing
arrangement determines the likelihood of civil war recurrence. They also found
that the outcome of civil war and third party security guarantors are related to
the duration of postwar peace, because increased governing size also increases the
rebel’s incentive to sustain peace rather than to renew war compared to the potential
loss of war resumption. Brancati and Snyder (2013) investigated the effect of political
arrangement after civil war on post-conflict stability. They found that holding elections
soon after a civil war ends generally increases the likelihood of renewed fighting.
Mason et al. (2011) argued that the duration of peace after civil wars is mainly
a function of the extent to which the outcome of the previous civil war preserved
a condition of “multiple sovereignty”, and the extent to which the post-civil war
environment created incentives for dissident groups to resort to violence rather than
to sustain the peace. Their hazard models suggest that the outcome of previous
conflict does affect the duration of the peace and this effect varies across time. The
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presence of peacekeeping forces has a substantial positive effect on peace duration.
Hartzell (2009) examined two positions regarding the impact of the fate of factions
in postwar environment on the duration of peace. One is that peace will be sustained
when the organizational structures of all but one of the factions that compete in a
war are destroyed or dismantled at the conflict’s end. The other is that peace can
be best preserved when rival groups agree to share state power at the war’s end.
Therefore, there is still no consensus regarding the effect of postwar environment on
the recurrence of civil wars. Moreover, the “instrumental school” often fails to account
for the effects of the prior stage in the peace process on subsequent implementation.
Moreover, a potential selection bias problem may rise if analysis focuses only on
implementation.

Summary of Critiques
The previous survey indicates that the existing literature on the recurrence
of civil war and the duration of peace after civil war has covered almost every
stage of the peace process. But there are several weaknesses inherent in the above
explanations. First of all, as Findley (2013) argued, peace emerges out of a process
that was comprised of battle, negotiation, agreement and implementation. However,
existing research generally ignores this interdependent nature of peace agreement
and implementation. As a result, we still know little about which stage of the
peace process is the most influential. Particularly, we still do not know whether the
breakdown of peace is because of flawed designs or the incomplete implementations
of such an agreement. Therefore, a complete picture of how peace agreements sustain
peace in the post-conflict period should integrate both the agreement design and
implementation stages.
Secondly, the role of third party mediation in the peace process has often been
obscured to a point where most studies ignore the distinctions between 1) self designed
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and mediated designed agreements in the design stage as well as 2) self implementation
and mediated implementation of peace agreements in the implementation stage. As a
matter of fact, many peace agreements are witnessed by, or assisted with, mediator(s).
But existing research rarely brings the mediation literature into civil war agreement
studies. Thus, they fail to identify how different agreement designs by different
actors (mediators or the war combatants) may have a significant influence on the
implementation of peace agreements which in turn affects the durability of peace.
Most research has stressed that the “commitment problem” is the central problem
facing negotiated settlement. I argue that since self designed agreements often take
place during a military stalemate and with the lack of a credible third party guarantee,
they are more likely to break down than mediated designed agreements. In addition,
considering the reputation of mediator(s), mediated agreements are more likely to be
implemented and have more marginal costs for the combatants if not implemented
(Beardsley 2006). Hence, they are more likely to sustain the peace in the aftermath
of civil wars.
Thirdly, compared to the vast amount of research on the design of a peace
agreement, the role of third-party mediation in the implementation phase has been
overlooked by most quantitative studies (DeRouen and Chowdhury 2013). Moreover,
most findings concerning the implementation are weakened by the lack of appropriate
datasets on the practice of agreements. For example, while DeRouen and Chowdhury
(2013) claim to examine the effect of mediation on the implementation of peace
agreements, they still employ the CWM dataset on agreement design and equate the
peace agreement terms on implementation with the actual implementation information.
This weakness is inherent in many previous studies. Instead, I will employ the PSED
dataset to supplement the Peace Agreement datasets with actual implementation
information.
Lastly, existing studies often fail to see that the commitment problem will still
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exist during the implementation stages. In other words, the signing of negotiated
settlements is only the first step toward peace and only after complete implementation
of provisions can the commitment problem be completely resolved and peace be
sustained. Thus, only looking at the design of the agreement or the implementation
of agreement gives us an incomplete picture of how negotiated settlement addresses
the commitment problem and how to bring enduring peace. In the following section, I
will discuss how third-party mediation can link the design and implementation stages
and help to resolve the commitment problem.
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AN EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK OF PEACE DURABILITY

While existing studies have stressed the role of a third party in the settlement
enforcement process, most of them have not seen the nexus between settlement design
and implementation advanced by third party mediators. Moreover, the role of third
party mediation has been generally underestimated, if not completely ignored. On
the other hand, civil war recurrence literature exclusively emphasizes the security
guarantor role played by a third party (mostly, UN peacekeeping forces) while ignoring
the important role a mediator can play. Thus, it is quite clear that there is a
disconnect between the intersecting roles of agreement design, implementation and
mediation in the literature. I contend that mediation can serve as the nexus between
design and implementation and thus help combatants be more likely to resolve any
commitment problems. A carefully designed agreement is not necessarily a sufficient
condition for durable peace after a civil war ends. Instead, a complete implementation
of such an agreement is also crucial. My main argument is summarized in Table 1.

Table 1: A Typology of Peace Process and Peace Durability

Design
Self Design

Mediated Design

Self Implementation

Recurrence

Suboptimal

Mediated Implementation

Suboptimal

Enduring Peace

Implementation

Firstly, a peace agreement can be designed either by combatants themselves
(i.e., self designed) or by a third party mediator (i.e., mediated designed). From
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the rationalist perspective, the quality of an agreement design depends on how the
commitment problem is addressed. According to Beardsley (2006) and Fearon (1995),
the involvement of a third party in the bargaining process is more likely to resolve
the commitment problem. Since a “good” agreement is supposed to address the
credible commitment problem facing combatants that is thought to more likely result
in the recurrence of civil wars, the presence of a third party mediator can help
mitigate this problem. The mediator can help signal the actor’s strength, resolve,
and preferences to the opponent and can help identify a mutually acceptable solution
to their disagreement, and make a credible commitment to this position without
post-conflict vulnerability (DeRouen and Chowdhury 2013). The mediator can employ
a formative strategy to transmit information on the preferences of adversaries, and
thus increase the propensity for both sides to accept a negotiated outcome (Asal et al.
2007). At the same time, mediation allows the parties to make credible commitments
to peace so that each side can have confidence that the other side will live up to
its promise during the implementation process (DeRouen and Chowdhury 2013). In
addition, mediators can also help to design more acceptable political or military
power-sharing provisions in the negotiation and convey information about the costs
and benefits of the implementation of that kind of agreement. In doing so, as Mattes
and Savun (2009) and Hoddie and Hartzell (2003) find, mediated settlements are
expected to be more likely to sustain peace after a civil war ends.
However, not every peace agreement is the result of third party mediation.
Combatants in civil wars can also reach agreements by themselves. Because mediation
is costly, combatants may be reluctant to request third party mediation if they
can design some strategies to solve their dispute (Beardsley 2011, 2006). After all,
the introduction of a third party mediator may also weaken their autonomy and
internationalize the conflict. Thus, many civil wars combatants, especially governments,
are worried that rebel groups may take advantage of mediation to acquire international
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recognition. In this sense, mediation is less likely to occur, let alone to help design the
peace agreement. Therefore, it is still unclear whether a mediated agreement is more
likely to make peace more durable after civil wars than a self-designed agreement.
Thus, I propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Mediated designed peace agreements are more likely to sustain peace in
the aftermath of civil wars than self designed agreements.
Secondly, many mediation studies have indicated that mediation often suffers
from the “time inconsistency” problem which means mediation can help end civil
war effectively in the short run but cannot sustain enduring peace in the long run
(Beardsley 2008, 2011, 2013; Quinn et al. 2013). The literature also addresses which
kind of particular strategy, such as facilitation, formulation and manipulation, is
most effective in the mediating process in ending civil wars and in sustaining the
peace. Given that these strategies are designed to address different concerns in the
mediating process they are likely to miss some vital information. Mediators may
employ several combined strategies in the same process and the obstacles to success
may be intertwined. In this sense, the quality of mediation not only depends on
which strategy is specifically employed but also on how and when it is used. Thus,
the traditional categorical approach to mediation effectiveness may suffer from some
shortcomings. That is why many studies often produce inconclusive results regarding
the role of mediation. The quality of mediation, and its impact on the peace process,
may consist of mediating strategies or mediating timing. I thus propose the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The higher the quality of mediation, the more durable the peace is in
the aftermath of civil wars.
Thirdly, mediation can also help address the three types of weakness in the
implementation process as argued by the instrumental approach, though the role of
a mediator in the implementation stages has been somewhat overlooked by recent
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quantitative studies (DeRouen and Chowdhury 2013). Often, negotiated settlements
are discouraged before or during the implementation stage due to the lack of state
capacity to sustain the agreement, leaving them just a “scrap of paper”(Arnault 2006;
DeRouen et al. 2010; Fortna 2003). For instance, DeRouen et al. (2010) examined
fourteen peace agreements in depth and found that the level of state capacity was
highly related to the success of implementation as well as the durability of peace in the
aftermath of civil wars. In the context of weak state capacity, mediation can assist
in establishing more realistic benchmarks for implementation; and, usually, more
detailed procedures to monitor compliance (Arnault 2006). Moreover, mediation is
often viewed as a kind of international support that is necessary for weak states to
implement an agreement. As Kirschner and Von Stein (2009) find, implementation is
more likely as international support increases. This is because international support,
such as mediation, often helps mitigate commitment problems, generates audience
costs, and provides the contingency of aid on implementation. Quinn et al. (2007)
also find that if agreements are supported by peacekeeping forces, they are more likely
to foster peace after civil wars. With regard to pressures deriving from the political
context, as Arnault (2006) argues, mediation will prod the combatants to reach a
joint understanding of the overall political situation to recommit them to protecting
the “middle ground” contained in the agreement and to chart a course that enables
them to manage dissatisfied constituencies while maintaining the broad terms of the
agreement. As for the unmet vital concerns, mediation requires engaging urgently
the parties in full-fledged negotiations over potential remedies that can be found to
satisfy these concerns. Thus, I advance the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Peace agreements with mediator(s) involved in the implementation are
more likely to sustain peace in the aftermath of civil wars.
From the discussion above, I view mediation as a nexus between the agreement
design and implementation stages. Mediators in civil wars can help combatants reach
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a mutually acceptable settlement by reducing the credible commitment problems,
providing reliable information about both parties’ resolve and strengths in designing
of peace agreement. Moreover, they can also provide support in the implementation
of a peace agreement. In doing so, mediators can better understand the demands
and concerns of both combatants and thus design a specific agreement to address the
barriers to enduring peace. In the implementation process, mediators are willing to
provide international support to monitor the process due to large international and
domestic audience costs. Similarly, compared to a self-designed agreement, mediation
also involves international costs for all the actors that create costly commitments.
Hence actors are more willing to implement the provisions. The following section will
discuss the research design of this project.
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RESEARCH DESIGN

The Data
The dataset in this project is mainly drawn from the collection of datasets in the
UCDP Project.2 However, none of these datasets include comprehensive information
about the content and implementation of peace agreements as well as third-party
mediation. To better design my research, I therefore use several supplemental data
to compile my own observations. The main three data sources are the UCDP Peace
Agreement Dataset, the Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset, and the Power-Sharing
Event Dataset (PSED).3 There are 79 peace agreements in the PSED signed between
warring parties in civil wars in the post-Cold War era from 1989 to 2006. The
PSED dataset provides two formats for analysis. One is the peace agreement in
the post-conflict period as the unit of analysis and the other is the government-rebel
dyad as the unit of analysis. I use the former in this project since I include a duration
model.4 Since I employ a time-varying model where variables are measured from
the date on which the peace agreement was signed until violence takes place, or the
observation period ends, there are multiple observations for most of the 79 peace
agreements which gives a total sample of 353 observations. Among the 79 peace
agreement, 32 broke down in a five-year period.
A peace agreement is defined as an agreement that “should address the problem
of the incompatibility, either by settling all or part of it, or by clearly outlining
a process for how the warring parties plan to regulate the incompatibility.
2

All

Data sets are available at http: //www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/. See Appendix C for
a full list of civil wars. (last accessed on July 31, 2014).
3
Peace Agreement Data can be obtained at http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/(last
accessed on July 31, 2014).
CWM data can be accessed with the replication data
via http://jpr.sagepub.com/content/48/5/663/suppl/DC1. The PSED data can be found at
http://www.giga-hamburg.de/en/project/power-sharing-in-post-conflict-situations (last accessed on
August 11,2014)
4
I also use the second format of the data as a robustness check. But the results are not reported
here.
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peace agreements, which concern, manage or regulate, the stated incompatibility
are brought into the list of peace agreements” (Harbom, Högbladh and Wallensteen
2006). According to the UCDP, civil war is defined as a contested incompatibility
over either government or territory between the government and (at least one) rebel
group, where the use of armed force has resulted in 25 battle-related deaths or more,
in at least one year (Harbom, Högbladh and Wallensteen 2006). The CWM adopts
Bercovitch et al’s definition of mediation as “a process of conflict management where
disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group,
or state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without
resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of law” (Bercovitch, Kremenyuk
and Zartman 2008, 343).

Variables
The dependent variable is the Durability of the Peace Agreement, enabling me
to examine the effect of negotiated settlement on the duration of peace after the civil
war ends. It should be noted that the post-conflict peace duration ends when violence
recurs, demonstrating that at least one party has walked away from the treaty or a
new treaty has been signed (Walter 2002, 2004). Therefore, I equate the breakdown
of a peace agreement with the recurrence of civil war, though in practice some peace
agreements are actually replaced with new/supplemental agreements. In my dataset,
I exclude these cases. I use the number of days the agreement was in effect (or until
its breakdown), or as of January 1, 2011.5 In some cases, the exact day the agreement
ended is unknown. In such cases, I use the last month of the year.
In this research, I am especially interested in whether my 2×2 typology of the
peace process can shed new light on the study of the durability of peace agreement
5

Since a duration model is used in this research, January 1, 2011 is the cut-off for right-censored
purpose. In addition, January 1, 2011 is also the release date of the Peace Agreement dataset. For
those ongoing wars in 2006, this is also a five-year observation period. If the exact date is missing,
I use the last day of the corresponding month or the last month of the corresponding year.
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in civil wars by linking mediation with the agreement design and implementation.
I create a dummy variable Mediated design to measure whether the agreement is
reached with the help of third party mediation and assigned value “1” if so; otherwise
I code as “0 ,” indicating a “self designed agreement”. Likewise, the dummy variable
Mediated implementation is measured as whether the peace agreement has been put
into place assisted by a third party mediator(s). I expect that peace agreements
designed by mediation are more likely to be implemented and thus more durable.
Thus, by interacting these two binary variables, I obtain four types of peace-processes
in my models.
Although I argue that the quality of mediation is also essential for the postwar
peace durability, there is not a satisfactory way to measure it. Given that the
main role of mediation in the design and implementation stages is to help warring
parties make credible commitment and honor it when putting the agreement into
practice, an indirect way to examine the quality of mediation is to look at whether
mediators help warring parties reach substantive power-sharing provisions and the
extent to which they are implemented. I theorize the design and implementation
stages as being interdependent in nature. Therefore, unlike existing research, I try to
measure the mediated design-implementation nexus together rather than separately
by examining whether a certain power-sharing provision is promised and whether
it has been implemented. As such, I can overcome the shortcomings in previous
studies that treat agreement design and implementation as two separate processes.
I create four groups of dummy variables to measure whether certain power-sharing
pacts promised in the design stage are implemented in the peace process.
First, the variable, Promise of Political Power-sharing, is coded as “1” when
a rebel group was promised senior or non-senior cabinet positions; otherwise as “0.”
Implementation of Political Power-sharing takes the value of “1” when there was
a change in the senior or non-senior cabinet of the national government involving
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rebels; otherwise as “0.” Similarly, Promise of Military Power-sharing takes the value
of “1” when a rebel group is promised integration into the national army command
or a rebel group is promised integration of rebel fighters into the national army,
police or a paramilitary force; otherwise as “0.” Likewise, Implementation of Military
Power-sharing is coded as “1” when a rebel representative had been integrated into
the national army command or rebel fighters had been integrated the national army,
police or a paramilitary force; otherwise as “0.”
Likewise, the variable, Promise of Economic Power-sharing, measures whether
a rebel group was promised state-owned companies or a rebel group was promised
positions in a resource commission. Implementation of Economic Power-sharing
is coded as “1” when rebel representatives had taken over state-owned companies
or their representatives had taken up positions in a commission regulating certain
resources or sectors of the country’s economy. Otherwise, these two are coded as “0.”
Finally, Promise of Territorial Power-sharing measures whether a law or government
decree was promised which introduced devolution or autonomy and it is coded “1” if
so. Likewise, Implementation of Territorial Power-sharing is coded as “1” if a law or
government decree introduced devolution or autonomy had been passed; otherwise as
“0.” Data on these variables are from PSED.
In addition, based on previous research on the durability of peace agreements, I
also create serveral control variables. First, Quinn et al. (2007) find that the duration
of conflict will affect postwar stability. They argue that the longer the previous civil
war lasted, the less likely civil war is to recur because both sides in the civil wars
have known the opposition’s resolve and the costs of continued fighting. In this sense,
they are less likely to engage in war again. Thus, I create a continuous variable
Conflict Duration to measure how long the war lasted in days. Following Ottmann
and Vüllers (2014), I also include Conflict Intensity and assign the value of “1” when
the civil conflict dyad between government forces and the rebel group includes at
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least one calendar year with more than 1000 battle-related deaths. I expect that
more intense conflicts harden the frontlines between the conflict parties, resulting in
more protracted post-conflict situations (Ottmann and Vüllers 2014). Furthermore,
I create a dummy variable Multiple Rebel Signatories to measure whether a peace
agreement was signed by more than one rebel group and take the value of “1” if
so. Finally, I control for the presence of UN peacekeepers in the peace process to
distinguish between the effects from mediation in both stages. The data for this
variable are from the replication data of Ottmann and Vüllers (2014). Table A1 in
Appendix A summarizes these variables.

Statistical Models
Beck, Katz and Tucker (1998) and Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn (2002) discuss
two approaches to modeling duration data: One is the Cox model and the other is
the binary logit model on Time-Series-Cross Sectional data. In this project, I use
Cox proportional hazards (PH) model (Cox 1972)

6

to test the above hypotheses.

Typically, a parametric model based on an exponential distribution can be
written as
log hi (t) = exp(α + β1 xi1 + β2 xik + · · · + βk xik )

(1)

This is a multiplicative model for the hazard. Here, i is a subscript for observation,
and the x’s are the covariates. The constant α in this model represents a kind of
log-baseline hazard, since log hi t = α[or hi (t) = eα ] when all of the x’s are zero.
The Cox Model, in contrast, leaves the baseline hazard function α(t) = log h0 (t)
unspecified:
log hi (t) = α(t) + β1 xi1 + β2 xik + · · · + βk xik
6

(2)

Since there are no strong theoretical reasons for expecting the hazard rate to take on a specific
function, I employ a Cox proportional hazard model instead of a parametric model such as the
Weibull.
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or, equivalently

hi (t) = h0 (t)exp(β1 xx1 + β2 xik + · · · + βk xik )
h(t, X) = h0 (t)e

PP

i=1 βi Xi

(3)
(4)

where vector X = (X1 , X2 , · · · , Xp ) are explanatory variables.
If two observations i and j differ in their x-values, with the corresponding linear
predictors
ηi = β1 xi1 + β2 xik + · · · + βk xik

(5)

ηj = β1 xj1 + β2 xjk + · · · + βk xjk

(6)

and

the hazard ratio for these two observations,
hi (t) h0 (t)eηi
=
hj (t) h0 (t)eηj
eηi
= ηj
e

(7)

is independent of time t. Consequently, the Cox Model is a proportional-harzards
model. This assumption is essential for the Cox model and in the later analysis, I test
this proportional assumption. In case the assumptions are unmet, as Box-Steffensmeier
and Zorn (2002) suggest, I include an interaction term of those time-varying covariates
with the logarithm of time.7
Given the nature of the repeated measurement in my data, I account for the
dependence within correlated observations by clustering the standard errors on peace
agreement (Box-Steffensmeier, De Boef and Joyce 2007). The Stata 12.0 package
is used for analysis of the data in this thesis (See Appendix B for Stata Code).

7

Note that the global test of the proportional hazards (PH) assumption and the Kaplan-Meier
test on each variable suggest that the PH assumption is met.
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RESULTS

Coefficient estimates from the Cox proportional hazards model reveal information
regarding the hazard rate. As such, positive coefficients imply the hazard is increasing,
or “rising,” with change in the covariate, and negatively signed coefficients imply
the hazard is decreasing or “falling” with change in the covariate. Hence, positive
coefficients imply shorter survival times while negative coefficients imply longer survival
times. Or put it differently, a ratio above one indicates an increase in the risk that
peace fails, while a value below one decreases the risk that peace fails. Table 2
reports the Cox PH estimating results where I control for one of the four mediation
design/implementation combinations. In Model 1, I only include mediated design
while in Model 2, I only include mediated implementation. Model 3 examines the
effect of mediated design when controlling for the effect of mediated implementation,
and Model 4 examines the conditional effects of the mediated design and mediated
implementation.
In Table 2, neither mediated design nor mediated implementation shows significant
influence on the postwar peace durability in Models 1-2, though their hazard ratios
are below one, suggesting peace agreements whether designed or implemented under
the help of mediators tend to sustain longer peace. Given statistical insignificance,
however, this inference needs further closer scrutiny. In Model 3, when I control for
mediated design, the effect of mediated implementation is still insignificant. Based
upon the results of Models 1-3, it is reasonable to infer whether there is a conditional
effect between mediated design and mediated implementation. Therefore, I include an
interaction term with mediated design and mediated implementation in Model 4. As
expected, all the three variables are statistically significant in Model 4. As a result,
the following discussion is mainly based on Model 4.
As Braumoeller (2004) and Brambor, Clark and Golder (2006) suggested, when
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Table 2: Cox PH Results: Mediated-Design and Mediated-Implementation
and the Durability of Peace

Mediated Design

Model 1
0.788
(0.352)

Mediated Implementation

Model 2

0.886
(0.347)

Model 3
0.638
(0.736)
1.272
(1.336)

0.999*
(0.000)
0.577
(0.456)
1.723
(1.285)
2.283
(1.202)
3.426
(2.771)
0.270***
(0.115)
0.105
(0.202)
0.163***
(0.106)
0.393
(0.267)
5.845*
(5.341)
0.198
(0.207)
0.000***
(0.000)
353
79
32
-100.166
1737.877
0.0000

0.999
(0.000)
0.526
(0.436)
1.824
(1.397)
2.497
(1.389)
3.151
(2.533)
0.273***
(0.117)
0.123
(0.233)
0.173***
(0.110)
0.387
(0.253)
5.641*
(5.122)
0.194
(0.203)
0.000
(.)
353
79
32
-100.033
49.717
0.0000

Mediated Design × Mediated Implementation
Conflict Duration
Conflict Intensity
UN Peacekeeping
Multiple Rebel Signatories
Promise of Political Power-sharing
Promise of Military Power-sharing
Promise of Economic Power-sharing
Promise of Territorial Power-sharing
Implementation of Political Power-sharing
Implementation of Military Power-sharing
Implementation of Economic Power-sharing
Implementation of Territorial Power-sharing
N
No. of subjects
No. of failures
Log pseudolikelihood
Wald χ2
Prob > χ2

0.999*
(0.000)
0.577
(0.441)
1.824
(1.423)
2.356
(1.229)
3.348
(2.633)
0.276***
(0.117)
0.117
(0.216)
0.171***
(0.110)
0.389
(0.260)
5.677*
(5.094)
0.211
(0.207)
0.000***
(0.000)
353
79
32
-100.075
1026.696
0.0000

Model 4
8.155***
(4.938)
4.020*
(3.238)
0.020***
(0.021)
0.999*
(0.000)
0.280
(0.262)
2.302
(1.991)
3.093*
(1.814)
3.211
(2.642)
0.248***
(0.113)
0.150
(0.275)
0.154***
(0.095)
0.403
(0.252)
6.635**
(5.424)
0.137*
(0.147)
0.000***
(0.000)
353
79
32
-95.917
1234.473
0.0000

Note:
(1)∗∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗ p < 0.1
(2) Hazard ratios rather than coefficients are reported, with robust standard errors statistics (given in parentheses)
clustered on peace agreement. Note that variables on power-sharing refer to pacts that are promised and
implemented consistently.
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Figure 1: Cumulative Baseline Hazards Rates for 2×2 Typology
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Note: Figure 1 shows the cumulative hazards at mean values of covariates for the 2 × 2 typology of
peace process. The plot is based on Model 4 in Table 2.

the interaction item in a model is statistically significant, the interest of interpretation
is no longer the main items because any inference based only on the main item is
misleading. Instead, the interaction term should be always more interesting as it can
reveal a more complicated mechanism behind the statistical result. More specifically,
Model 4 suggests that the effect of mediated design on postwar peace durability
depends on the effect of mediated implementation. In other words, either mediated
design or mediated implementation alone cannot significantly influence the durability
of post-civil war peace, but together they are able to produce more pacifying effects
as Models 1-4 suggested. The hazard ratio for the interaction item, Mediated Design
× Mediated Implementation is less than one and significant at the 99% confident
level, suggesting that peace agreements designed and implemented by mediators are
less likely to break down in five-year period. Therefore, this result confirms the logic
presented in Table 1.
To understand my explanatory framework, I plot the cumulative baseline hazard
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Figure 2: Smoothed Hazards for 2×2 Typology
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Note: Figure 2 shows the smoothed hazards at mean values of covariates for the 2 × 2 typology of
peace process. The plot is based on Model 4 in Table 2.

plot in Figure 1, the smoothed hazard plot in Figure 2, and the survival function plot
in Figure 3 based on Model 4 in Table 2. Specifically, mediated design & mediated
implementation can significantly decrease the hazard rate for peace agreement as
shown in Figure 2. As further shown in Figure 3, though all four types of peace
processes show a decreasing survival probability, the interaction term has the highest
survival probability among them. Furthermore, Figure 3 also shows predicted survival
probabilities for the 2×2 typology in Table 1 which is highly consistent with my
theoretical expectations. Together, these plots suggest that peace agreement designed
and implemented by mediators tends to have a higher survival probability and is
therefore more likely to sustain a longer peace in the aftermath of civil wars.
Regarding the “promise” and “implementation” of peace agreement, the results
in Table 2 suggest that during the design stage only including military power-sharing
pacts and territorial power-sharing pacts can significantly reduce the likelihood of the
breakdown of peace agreement as their hazard ratios are below one and statistically
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Figure 3: Survivor Functions for 2×2 Typology
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Note: Figure 3 shows predicted survival probability for the 2 × 2 typology of peace process when
holding other variable at their means. The plot is based on Model 4 in Table 2.

significant. This result is consistent across the four models. However, as Jarstad
and Nilsson (2008, 215) point out, the fact that a promised power-sharing pact was
implemented does not necessarily mean implementation had a positive influence on
the prospects of lasting peace. Implementing certain types of power-sharing pacts
could even bring down the peace agreement.

For example, promise of military

power-sharing shows a significantly decreasing risk of peace failing across the four
models in Table 2, while implementation of military power-sharing suggests a significant
increase in the risk of peace failure across the four models in Table 2. Although there
is no solid theory yet to explain why peace is more likely to be sustained when
promising military power-sharing but is more likely to fail when promised military
power-sharing is implemented, we could reasonably infer that certain positions could
provide rebels with more resources or opportunities to strengthen themselves and thus
to resume fighting against governments. This finding may also support the “supply
model” of civil war outbreak as a function of the opportunity to organize rebellion
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(Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Access to military resources is
one of the deciding opportunities.
Moreover, implementation of territorial power-sharing is highly significant in
Table 2, “suggesting that when these power-sharing pacts are being implemented
there is virtually no risk at all that peace will fail” (Jarstad and Nilsson 2008,
218). Of these pacts that are promised and implemented, none is followed by armed
conflict, which explains these rather extreme hazard rates values. About 49% of
the total cases promised a law introducing territorial devolution or autonomy (i.e.,
territorial power-sharing). However, in only 2.55% of the total cases was the promise
implemented. This also explain why the coefficient is close to zero. Based on these
results, we can infer that promising territorial power-sharing is essential for sustaining
postwar peace but putting the promise into practice is also extremely difficult. Once
the promised territorial power-sharing is implemented, there is a greater chance that
civil conflict will not recur. This is consistent to Fearon and Laitin (2011) that
the “sons of the soil” thesis is holding up in the postwar peace process. Finally,
while economic power-sharing is not statistically significant in both the design and
implementation stages in Models 1-3, economic power-sharing still tends to reduce
the risk of peace failing as its hazard ratio indicates in Table 2. However, I find
that when control for the effect of mediation in both stages, implementing economic
power-sharing becomes statistically significant in Model 4.
As for the control variables, I only find that the variable conflict duration is
statistically significant across the four models, which suggests that once an intensive
civil war ended with a signed peace agreement, there is little chance that the peace
agreement will break down since both warring parties have suffered from the fighting
and the peace committee may sound more credible for them. While UN peacekeeping
and multiple rebels are not statistically significant in all four models, their results tend
to suggest that peace agreements are more likely to break down in cases where there
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Figure 4: Survivor Function for Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement
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Note: Figure 4 shows predicted survival probability for the 2 × 2 typology of peace process in the
case of Free Aceh Movement when holding other variable at their observed values. The plot is based
on Model 4 in Table 2. Mediated Design & Mediated Implementation was the observed peace process.
Based on the predicted survival probability, we can assume that the peace agreement should have
sustained longer peace if it were also designed by mediators.

are multiple actors (both domestic and international) involved.
To better understand the statistical results, I use the example of the Free Aceh
Movement in Indonesian for further illustration. In 2005, the Indonesia government
and the regional Government of Aceh signed the Memorandum of Understanding
between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement
that ended a thirty-year civil war and is still securing peace today. Before they
signed the agreement, Finland mediated their conflict and helped them reach a mutual
acceptable settlement. On 16 July 2005, the Indonesian Minister of Communication
and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) announced a peace deal to end the thirty-year
insurgency. In terms of the quality of agreement design, this agreement provides
for the conditions necessary for achieving peace, including the delineation of the
relationship between the Central Government of Indonesia and the Government of
Aceh. It also elaborates on security arrangements, political participation, economic
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revival and promotion of human rights in Aceh. Regarding the implementation, it
also establishes a EU-ASEAN monitoring mission to monitor the implementation of
the agreement.8 In this sense, although the agreement was mediated and designed
with the help of Finland, it was included international monitoring, serving the role
of mediated implementation. On December 27 2005, the leaders of the Free Aceh
Movement announced that they had disbanded their military wing.9 The action,
which took effect immediately, followed from earlier peace talks and the destruction
of 840 weapons by international observers. The Free Aceh movement commander
Sofyan Daud told reporters, “The Aceh national army is now part of civil society,
and will work to make the peace deal a success.”10 As a sign of how the peace process
was progressing the founder of Aceh’s separatist rebel movement, Hasan di Tiro,
returned to Indonesia on October 11, 2008 after nearly 30 years in exile.
The Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic
of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement essentially resolved economic issues by
implementing a new law on the government of Aceh. After the tsunami disaster on
December 26, 2004, the demand for rebuilding Aceh was very popular. However, the
government of Aceh lacked the economic leverage necessary for reconstruction at that
moment. Under this context, the negotiation was essentially concerned about how a
new peace agreement could make the economy in Aceh work so that the reconstruction
process could be started as soon as possible.
Translating this case study into an analytical account, Figure 4 plots the survival
function for four different types of peace process, holding other variables at the
observed values. Mediated design and mediated implementation are the actual processes
that happened in Indonesia and the other three are hypothetical scenarios. The
8

The
full
text
of
this
agreement
can
be
accessed
via
http://peacemaker.un.org/indonesia-memorandumaceh2005 (last accessed on September 14,
2014).
9
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4561922.stm (last accessed on September 14, 2014).
10
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia-pacific/2008/10/2008101144652814370.html.(last
accessed on September 14, 2014).
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predicted survival probability for the mediated-design & mediated-implementation is
the highest, as opposed to the other three process when holding all other variables the
same. This case is consistent with the statistical results in Table 2, which suggests
that a peace agreement that has been designed by a mediator and implemented with
the help of an international mediator tends to have the most pacifying effects on peace
durability after civil wars.
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CONCLUSION

In this thesis, I examine the effects of agreement design and implementation
on the durability of post-civil war peace through the introduction of third party
mediation in both stages. I find that these two stages are interdependent and thus it
is more appropriate to integrate them into the same theoretical framework.
Several important findings need to be highlighted here. First, my statistical
results show that, mediation can help disputants reach agreement more quickly in
the design stage, and to some extent peace agreements designed by a mediator are
more likely to secure post-civil war peace, though they are not statistically significant.
That said, neither mediated design nor mediated implementation alone can produce
enduring peace in the aftermath of civil wars. Instead, the effect of one depends on the
other as I found that there is a strong conditional effect between mediated design and
mediated implementation. This is consistent to my theoretical expectation that peace
agreement only designed and implemented by mediators can sustain longer peace.
Considering the significant coefficients of mediated design & mediated implementation,
the international community might be cautious when they participate in an agreement
negotiation by carefully considering the real-world trade-off between the ability to
reach an agreement and the sustainability of that agreement over time by offering
additional mediation after the signing of peace agreements. Otherwise, mediation
would not produce long-term pacifying effects after civil wars.
Second, by adopting a new measurement of the design-implementation nexus,
I find that not all implementations of power-sharing pacts are conducive to lasting
peace. Specifically, territorial power-sharing pacts consistently show pacifying effects
in contrast to the other three types of power-sharing pacts. Depending on opportunities
provided for rebels, taking over certain key positions in national government or a key
economic sector could increase the risk of fighting as rebel groups may have increased
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their opportunity and capacity to rebel.
However, there are also some weaknesses that need further study. First, the
nexus between design and implementation may need more studies since my results
show that these power-sharing provisions follow a different logic in both stages. I have
not looked at the strategic interaction between mediator and disputants in these two
stages, and how the interaction can affect the durability of peace agreement (Findley
2013). Second, the lack of solid data on agreement implementation still constrains my
analysis timeline. Although the PSED dataset provides agreement implementation
from 1989-2006 (Ottmann and Vüllers 2014), it covers only a small proportion of peace
agreements signed from 1946 to the present, according to the UCDP Peace agreement
dataset. If we have more solid data covering this period, we then are able to compare
systematically the post-World War II and post-Cold War periods to see if there are
other underlying patterns in civil war agreement studies. Moreover, a majority of
civil wars in the post-Cold War period have a historical legacy, such as the colonial
experience. We are interested in whether this kind of time-varying covariation will
influence the durability of peace agreements, especially on the national attitude and
government resolve toward civil war recurrence.
Finally, many civil wars have experienced other forms of third party intervention
(Regan 2002). Unlike mediation, those kinds of interventions have more dampening
effects, because foreign interventions are perceived to be essential to continue or end a
civil war or prevent its recurrence. Further research should also focus on the relative
capability change between the government and rebel groups over time. That being
said, sometimes peace agreements are only signed because either the government
or rebels just want to buy time to increase their capability to resume the fighting
again (Richmond 1998), which might counter any pacifying efforts from third party
mediation. Thus, we might need more discussion on the timing of when a peace
agreement breaks down and civil war recurs.
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APPENDIX A DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

Obs
Mediated Design
353
Mediated Implementation
353
Conflict Duration
353
Conflict Intensity
353
UN Peacekeeping
353
Multiple rebel signatories
353
Promise of Political Power-sharing
353
Promise of Military Power-sharing
353
Promise of Economic Power-sharing
353
Promise of Territorial Power-sharing
353
Implementation of Political Power-sharing
353
Implementation of Military Power-sharing
353
Implementation of Economic Power-sharing 353
Implementation of Territorial Power-sharing 353

Mean
Std. Dev.
.544
.499
.476
.5
2024.694 2722.743
.193
.395
.142
.349
.139
.346
.297
.458
.606
.489
.173
.379
.49
.501
.272
.446
.221
.415
.02
.14
.025
.158

Min Max
0
1
0
1
99 9641
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
0
1
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APPENDIX B STATA CODE FOR REPLICATION RESULTS

The following contains the Stata code for replication results of this thesis.

use "/Users/chongchen/Dropbox/MAThesis/PSED_agreement_chenchong2015_coxph.dta"
stset edate, fail(recur=1) id(psedagID) origin(time PostStartDate)
/*Descrptive summary*/
sutex2 med_imp med_design inter ///
durationDY intDY unpko multireb ///
ps_political ps_military ps_economic ps_territory ///
ppsPROM_IMP mpsPROM_IMP epsPROM_IMP tpsPROM_IMP, minmax
*****Table 2 Model 1
stcox med_design ///
durationDY intDY unpko multireb ///
ps_political ps_military ps_economic ps_territory ///
ppsPROM_IMP mpsPROM_IMP epsPROM_IMP tpsPROM_IMP, ///
robust cluster(psedagID)
*****Table 2 Model 2
stcox med_imp ///
durationDY intDY unpko multireb ///
ps_political ps_military ps_economic ps_territory ///
ppsPROM_IMP mpsPROM_IMP epsPROM_IMP tpsPROM_IMP, ///
robust cluster(psedagID)
*****Table 2 Model 3
stcox med_design med_imp ///
durationDY intDY unpko multireb ///
ps_political ps_military ps_economic ps_territory ///
ppsPROM_IMP mpsPROM_IMP epsPROM_IMP tpsPROM_IMP, ///
robust cluster(psedagID)
*****Table 2 Model 4
stcox med_imp med_design inter ///
durationDY intDY unpko multireb ///
ps_political ps_military ps_economic ps_territory ///
ppsPROM_IMP mpsPROM_IMP epsPROM_IMP tpsPROM_IMP, ///
robust cluster(psedagID)
****Figure 1 based on Model 4
stcox med_imp med_design inter ///
durationDY intDY unpko multireb ///
ps_political ps_military ps_economic ps_territory ///
ppsPROM_IMP mpsPROM_IMP epsPROM_IMP tpsPROM_IMP, ///
nohr robust cluster(psedagID) basesurv(s) basehc(h) basec(c)
/*Figure 1*/
stcurve, cumhaz at1(med_design=1 med_imp=1 ) ///
at2(med_design=0 med_imp=1) ///
at3(med_design=1 med_imp=0) ///
at4(med_design=0 med_imp=0) ///
legend(row(3))
/*Figure 2*/
stcurve, hazard at1(med_design=1 med_imp=1 ) ///
at2(med_design=0 med_imp=1) ///
at3(med_design=1 med_imp=0) ///
at4(med_design=0 med_imp=0) ///
kernel(gauss) legend(row(3))
/*Figure 3*/
stcox med_imp med_design inter ///
durationDY intDY unpko multireb ///
ps_political ps_military ps_economic ps_territory ///
ppsPROM_IMP mpsPROM_IMP epsPROM_IMP tpsPROM_IMP, ///
nohr robust cluster(psedagID) basesurv(surv1)
generate surv5=surv1^exp((0-.0006865*1170-1.392954*1)) /*no mediation*/
generate surv6=surv1^exp((1.391198*1-.0006865*1170-1.392954*1)) /*no design+implementation*/
generate surv7=surv1^exp((2.098616*1-.0006865*1170-1.392954*1)) /*design +no implementation*/
generate surv8=surv1^exp((1.391198*1+ 2.098616*1-3.906854*1-.0006865*1170-1.392954*1)) /*design+implementation*/
label var surv5 "Self-Design & Self-Implementation"
label var surv6 "Self-Design & Mediated-Implementation"
label var surv7 "Mediated-Design & Self-Implementation"
label var surv8 "Mediated-Design & Mediated-Implementation"
line surv5 surv6 surv7 surv8 _t, sort ylab(0 .1 to 1) xlab(0 500 to 2000) lcolor(black) lpattern(dash) lwidth(thick)
/*Figure 4*/
generate surv9=surv1^exp((0-.0006865*1246-1.392954*1 -1.273266*1-1.870395*1 -.9086287*1+ 1.892299*1))
generate surv10=surv1^exp((1.391198*1-.0006865*1246-1.392954*1 -1.273266*1-1.870395*1 -.9086287*1+ 1.892299*1))
generate surv11=surv1^exp((2.098616*1-.0006865*1246-1.392954*1 -1.273266*1-1.870395*1 -.9086287*1+ 1.892299*1))
generate surv12=surv1^exp((1.391198*1+ 2.098616*1-3.906854*1-.0006865*1246-1.392954*1 -1.273266*1-1.870395*1 -.9086287*1+ 1.892299*1)) /*real process*/
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label var surv9 "Self-Design & Self-Implementation"
label var surv10 "Self-Design & Mediated-Implementation"
label var surv11 "Mediated-Design & Self-Implementation"
label var surv12 "Mediated-Design & Mediated-Implementation"
line surv9 surv10 surv11 surv12 _t, sort ylab(.6 .7 to 1) xlab(0 500 to 2000) lcolor(black) lpattern(dash) lwidth(thick)
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APPENDIX C CIVIL WAR PEACE AGREEMENTS

The following list contains all peace agreements in this thesis.
location

paname

SideA

SideB

PostEndDate

Haiti
Mexico

Government of Haiti
Government of Mexico

Forces of Raol Cdras
EZLN

03/07/1998
16/02/2001

UK
Macedonia
Croatia
Serbia (Yugoslavia)
Serbia (Yugoslavia)

Governor’s Island Agreement
San Andrs Accords
Agreement for a Firm
and Lasting Peace
Chapultepec Peace Agreement
Final Agreement National
Government- Popular Liberation Army
Good Friday Agreement
Ohrid Agreement
Erdut Agreement
Brioni Agreement
Kosovo Peace Plan

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Washington Agreement

Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Guatemala
El Salvador
Colombia

Bosnia-Herzegovina

Moldova

Georgia

Guinea Bissau
Mali
Senegal
Niger
Niger
Cte d’Ivoire
Cte d’Ivoire
Cte d’Ivoire
Cte d’Ivoire
Liberia
Liberia
Liberia
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Congo
Democratic Republic
of Congo (Zaire)
Democratic Republic
of Congo (Zaire)
Uganda
Burundi

Burundi

Burundi
Rwanda
Somalia
Somalia
Djibouti

General Framework Agreement for
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina
(Dayton Agreement)
Memorandum on the Basis for
Normalization of Relations between
the Republic of Moldova
and Transdniestria
Declaration on measures for a political
settlement of the Georgian/Abkhaz conflict
Agreement Between the
Government of Guinea Bissau
and the Self-Proclaimed
Military Junta
Tamanrasset Accord
Accord general de paix entre
le gouvernement de la republique du
Senegal el le Mouvement des
forces democratique de la Casamace (MFDC)
Paris Accord
Ouagadougou Accord
Linas-Marcoussis Peace Accords
Accra II
Accra III
Pretoria Agreement on the Peace
Process in Cte d’Ivoire
Banjul III Agreement
Banjul IV Agreement
Accra Peace Agreement
Abidjan Peace Agreement
Lom Peace Agreement
Abuja Ceasefire Agreement
El Geneina Agreement
Abeche Agreement
Tripoli-1 Agreement
Bangui-2 Agreement
Dougia Accord
Reconciliation Agreement
Donya Agreement
Tripoli-2 Agreement
Yebibou Agreement
Tripoli Accord
Agreement on Ending Hostilities
in the Republic of Congo
Lusaka Accord
Inter-Congolese Political Negotiations
(The Final Act)
Yumbe Peace Agreement
Arusha Peace and Reconciliation
Agreement for Burundi
Global Ceasefire agreement between
Transitional Government and the Forces
pour la defence de la
democratie (CNDD-FDD)
Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement
between the Government of Burundi
and the Palipehutu-FNL
Arusha Accords
Addis Ababa Agreement
Nairobi Declaration on National Reconciliation
Agreement on Peace and
National Reconciliation

Government of Guatemala

URNG

29/12/2001

Government of El Salvador

FMLN

16/01/1997

Government of Colombia

EPL

15/02/1996

Government
Government
Government
Government
Government

PIRA
UCK
Serbian Republic of Krajina
Republic of Slovenia
UCK
Croatian Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina

10/04/2003
13/08/2006
12/11/2000
22/05/1992
03/06/2004

of
of
of
of
of

UK
Macedonia
Croatia
Serbia
Serbia

01/03/1999

Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina

Serbian Republic of
Bosnia-Herzegovina

21/11/2000

Government of Moldova

PMR

08/05/2002

Government of Georgia

Republic of Abkhazia

04/04/1999

Government of Guinea-Bissau

Military Junta for the
Consolidation of Democracy,
Peace and Justice

31/01/1999

Government of Mali

MPA

06/01/1996

Government of Senegal

MFDC

30/12/2009

Government
Government
Government
Government
Government

FLAA
ORA/CRA
MJP, MPCI, MPIGO
MJP, MPCI, MPIGO
MJP, MPCI, MPIGO

16/05/1994
09/10/1999
24/01/2003
07/06/2004
09/11/2004

Government of Cte D’Ivoire

FRCI

06/04/2010

Government
Government
Government
Government
Government
Government
Government
Government
Government
Government
Government
Government
Government
Government
Government
Government

INPFL
NPFL, INPFL
LURD, MODEL
RUF
RUF
RUF
FNT
FNT
CNR
CSNPD
MDD
MDD
FARF
MDJT
MDJT
FUCD

21/12/1990
31/10/1992
18/08/2008
13/05/1997
26/05/2000
10/11/2005
31/12/1993
12/10/1999
22/10/1993
11/08/1999
15/12/1997
03/07/2004
07/05/2003
27/05/2002
18/08/2010
24/12/2011

Ninjas, Cocoyes, Ntsiloulous

14/06/2002

of
of
of
of
of

of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of
of

Niger
Niger
Cte D’Ivoire
Cte D’Ivoire
Cte D’Ivoire

Liberia
Liberia
Liberia
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad
Chad

Government of Congo (Brazzaville)
Government of Democratic
Republic of Congo (Kinshasa)
Government of Democratic
Republic of Congo (Kinshasa)
Government of Uganda

MLC, RCD, RCD-ML

06/08/1999

MLC, RCD, RCD-ML

02/04/2008

UNRF II

24/12/2007

Government of Burundi

CNDD, Frolina, Palipehutu

28/08/2005

Government of Burundi

CNDD-FDD

16/11/2008

Government of Burundi

Palipehutu-FNL

01/03/2008

Government of Rwanda
Government of Somalia
Government of Somalia

RPF
SSDF, USC/SNA, SPM
USC/SNA

31/08/1993
05/06/1993
23/06/1994

Government of Djibouti

FRUD

26/12/1999
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Mozambique
South Africa
Comoros
Sudan
Sudan
Sudan

General Agreement on Reform
and Civil Concord
Gbadolite Declaration on Angola
Bicesse Agreement
Lusaka Protocol
Memorandum of Understanding
Memorandum of Understanding
on Peace and National Reconciliation
in Cabinda province
Acordo Geral de Paz
Interim Constitution
Famboni Declaration
Comprehensive Peace Agreement
Cairo Agreement
Darfur Peace Agreement

Afghanistan

Islamabad Accord

Government of Afghanistan

Afghanistan

Jalalabad Agreement

Government of Afghanistan

Afghanistan
Tajikistan
India
India
Bangladesh
Nepal

Mahipar Agreement
Moscow Declaration
Bodoland Autonomous Council Act
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